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IT is rumored that some time after the inauguration the President may make an aggressive popular campaign in behalf of the League to Enforce Peace. He could not do a more useful thing at this time than to deliver a series of half a dozen speeches in the big centers setting forth the change in our foreign relations, pointing out our duties and responsibilities, and demanding the more active support of the people. He could remind weak-kneed Democrats that the League was endorsed in the Democratic platform and that the platform was endorsed at the polls. He could appear in Boston and ask the people of Massachusetts whether they approve of Senator Lodge's "little-Americanism." He might go to Illinois or some other Republican center and inquire whether this very serious business is to be used for party politics. He could remind the country that what was a small propaganda only a few months ago has now been officially approved by the nine Allies, by the four Central Powers, by most of the European neutrals, by the dominant party in the United States, and by a large number of Republicans excluding the backsliders. He could go on to show that the League fulfils the real aims of American foreign policy under the new conditions prevailing in the world, that it reinsures Pan-Americanism, that it associates us actively with all those forces which aim at security and the peaceful development of all nations. He could point out that it is the keystone of preparedness, that isolated we could hope to defend nothing but our actual territory, that if our influence is to count in the world as we would want it to, it must be in alliance with the liberal forces of Europe and the Americas. If the President made such a tour it would probably alter the tone of international discussion immediately. The fact that he had aroused America would react on Europe. It would give immensely quickened vitality to those groups in the warring countries who care more for a stable settlement than for territorial gains. A demonstration to Europe that we were utterly serious in the matter would turn scepticism into approval, acquiescence into enthusiasm.

ONE thing the Administration could and ought to do before Congress adjourns. It would not only be of unquestionable value to those who are now suffering in Europe, but it would radically improve the temper in which the world approaches the coming peace negotiations. The President should go before Congress and ask for an act creating an American Relief Commission to administer aid which involves crossing belligerent lines. The President of the United States should have power to appoint the chairman of this commission, who would be free to select his own staff. American officials abroad should be directed to

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give the commission assistance. An appropriation of five hundred thousand dollars would cover the expenses. By creating this commission the United States would strengthen those Americans in Belgium and elsewhere who are struggling against discouraging odds because they have no official standing.

BUT if the Administration wishes to do a handsome job it will not stop when it has created a commission and paid its expenses. It will ask Congress to appropriate at least a hundred million dollars for the relief of noncombatants in all the occupied territories. The sum would literally save thousands of human lives, would prevent the breaking of families and the destruction of a whole generation in countries like Belgium, Poland and Serbia. The tax on the United States would hardly be felt, and even if it were, so much the better. If precedents are required there is the act of April 19th, 1906, in relief of the San Francisco conflagration, of May 11th, 1908, in relief of the sufferers from cyclone in certain southern states, of February 18th, 1911, in relief of famine in China. What possible objection is there to the plan? The need is clear. Private charity cannot deal with the immensity of the suffering. The benefit to the people of Europe is clear. They will be fed and clothed, sustained and comforted. The benefit to the prestige of America is clear, so clear that only dullards can miss the point.

A RECENT hint given by the Administration that all ambassadors and ministers are expected to hand in their resignations at the beginning of the President's second term contains the promise of an improved American diplomacy. Already three ministers have resigned and the rest are expected to do so within the next few weeks. Those who know the value of expert non-partisan diplomatic agents will hope that the beginning of a new Presidential term will be used as an opportunity for politely combing the inefficient members out of the diplomatic service. Unfortunately it comes to the politician as an equally good opportunity to pay political debts. How the President can resist the pressure from this greedy and quite dissatisfied source is a serious question. Since Mr. Bryan abandoned the Secretaryship of State, however, he has taken steps to strengthen the department, which gives ground for hope that at this critical time an already overworked and insufficient organization will not be further weakened by political compromises. Secretary Lansing himself has grown up in the service, as has the new Ambassador to Mexico, Mr. Fletcher. Just this past week, William Phillips, who has been a very efficient third secretary, has been appointed to the assistant secretaryship, despite adverse pressure from without. It is confidently anticipated that in the future house cleaning, the President will be able to resist equally well the temptations to strengthen himself at home by weakening the country abroad.

BITS of the French text of the Allies' reply to President Wilson have been cabled to the New York *Times*. They prove that the document was not an easy one to translate. Even so, and even if all allowance be made for the fact that the translator had to do his work in a hurry, the version published in this country is worse than it has any right to be. "Such guarantees to which they are entitled" is not English. Neither is such a phrase as "the assimilation, established in the American note, between the two groups of belligerents." As for "her [Germany's] simulating contempt for all principles of humanity," who could have guessed, while trying to find a meaning for "simulating contempt," that these words were represented in the French text by "mépris systematique?" It is useful for a translator of French into English to know both languages. To know one of them is almost necessary.

THE Committee on Industrial Insurance, appointed by the New York Society of Medical Jurisprudence, has reported unfavorably on the project of compulsory state insurance, and the Society has voted to oppose any effort at the present session of the legislature to pass an industrial insurance law. Coming almost simultaneously with the announcement by Governor McCall of a broad health insurance policy for Massachusetts, the objections have a curious significance. To say that such a law is "pampering," "paternalistic" and un-American is, of course, conventional. That the amount in savings-banks has increased surprisingly in the last year is rather unnecessary irony. That in Germany the working of the law has led to the lessened income of physicians is hardly a fact to be greeted with enthusiasm by the Medical Jurisprudence Society. That "under any plan there will always be an average number of days of sickness among working people" is a truism of the same pragmatic importance to the discussion as that "accidents will happen." On the other hand, that there would be infinite difficulties of detail and that the large "roving" worker population, most in need of the law's benefits, would escape them because its scope is local instead of national, are le-

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gitimate objections. But the salient truth about the report is that it doesn't make out an honest, scientific case against industrial insurance. It merely cites objections incidental to the practical undertaking of the plan rather than proofs of the social valuelessness of the undertaking as a whole. It is a captious, not a critical report. Hostility such as that of the American Federation of Labor will be much more difficult really to overcome. The trade unions of Great Britain, now warmly in sympathy with the national insurance act, originally opposed it on just the same grounds as does now American labor—jealousy of their prerogatives. So when the society uses the objections of labor to buttress its case against social insurance, historically, at any rate, it is resting on a weak reed.

AFTER a bitter struggle in Pennsylvania between the Penrose-McNichol and the Vare-Brumbaugh factions the former achieved a signal victory on New Year's day by the choice of the Honorable Richard J. Baldwin for the speakership of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. His chief claim to preferment, as he himself proudly pointed out, rested upon his "record." In the main this record consists of six terms in the state legislature during which he wore the Penrose collar imperturbably, advertising the fact on all occasions in an oratorical diction strongly reminiscent of big Bill Devery. Upon the emergence in the state of the progressive movement Mr. Baldwin further distinguished himself by embittered opposition to legislation on local option, child labor, and workmen's compensation. Under the circumstances Pennsylvania's only basis of hope for a Happy New Year politically, rests upon the fact that the success of the Vare-Brumbaugh faction might have been even more disastrous to the state. The victory of Senator Penrose is the more remarkable because it was achieved without the assistance of a scrap of federal patronage of which he was deprived by the defeat of Mr. Hughes. But it is a terrifying victory, for the factional struggle within the Republican party of Pennsylvania is certain to take on new dimensions and new bitterness. It may result in an attempt to "Sulzerize" the governor. It may defeat both wings of the Republican party and elect Mr. Vance McCormick to the governorship in 1918. From a national point of view the continued dominance of abysmally stupid reactionaries in Pennsylvania is a calamity which will further dishearten all those who are honestly struggling to rehabilitate the Republican party. Senator Penrose out-Bourbons the Bourbons. Like them he has learned nothing; unlike them he has forgotten everything, including what happened on November 7th last.

A Masterpiece in Diplomacy

THE long time it took to frame the Allied reply indicated the immense difficulty of agreement in so complicated a coalition. The note itself proves it. Written into it with a nicety of phrase are the elements of what is probably the most tangled problem ever dealt with by responsible statesmen. It is impossible even to enumerate the factors which required attention in framing the answer to President Wilson. There was, to begin with, the movement of opinion in the different countries and in different classes and sections within the countries. The authors had to consider, for example, not only the British democracy (by no means of one mind), but the Russian liberals and the Italian imperialists and French irredentism. They had to consider the promises they had made, and the probabilities they could achieve. They had to find formulæ which united the Allies, impressed the neutrals, and, if possible, divided the people of Central Europe. They sought a statement of purposes which took account of all the hopes they had aroused and the bargains they had made, justified a continuation of the war for some kind of victory in the field without committing them to war without end. They have succeeded with uncanny skill. They have produced a brilliantly ambiguous, a triumphantly equivocal document.

The off-hand interpretation of course is that of the *Daily Graphic:* the Allies demand the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of the Trentino and Trieste to Italy, the constitution of the Slavonic provinces of Austria into a separate state, the transference of Transylvania from Hungary to Rumania, the restoration of the ancient kingdom of Bohemia, the creation of a united Poland under a Russian protectorate, and, in addition to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe (by giving the Straits to Russia), the liberation of the Armenians, Arabs and Syrians from Turkish rule.

The note could mean all this, and so it has been read by extremists everywhere. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* and the London *Daily Graphic* are of one mind. Each is elated or angry as the case may be. The agreement would go further. Both sets of extremists would admit that these are terms which can be dictated only after a victory so smashing as to bring the Allies, if not to Berlin, at least to Vienna. There are several things, however, which show that the authors of the note were willing to throw phrases to the extremists, but that they hardly intend the language to mean what the extremists say it means. The first of these factors is the speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Guildhall. He virtually promised a victory this year:

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> In 1917 the armies of Britain will be more formidable than ever in training, in efficiency, in equipment; and *you may depend upon it, if you give them the necessary support they will cleave a road to victory through the dangers and perils of the next few months.*

Now obviously, unless a miracle happens, they will not in the next few months cleave a road to victory which leads to the restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia. And since the Prime Minister had just come from the Rome conference, we must assume that he knew exactly what he was talking about. Had he meant what the extremists think the Allied note means, he would have called upon the British people for an effort that looked far beyond 1917.

Closer examination of the note shows that its authors took perfect care not to commit themselves to the terms which the *Daily Graphic* outlines. They do not say that the whole of Alsace-Lorraine must be ceded to France. What they say is that there must be "restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force *or against the will of their populations.*" They have left open the question of whether eastern Alsace and eastern Lorraine are French or not. They have indicated the possibility of a division of the provinces. Nor do they say they insist upon transferring Galicia and Posen to a Russian Poland, for these territories were not wrested from Russia but from Poland.

They do not say Italy must have Trieste, for it is a disputable question whether Trieste is an Italian city. They have safeguarded this point further by stating that a stable settlement must be "based *alike* upon the principle of nationalities, on the right which all peoples, whether small *or* great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, *and also* upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjust attacks." Clearly this does not necessarily mean Italian possession of Trieste or the Dalmatian coast, because that might result in the economic strangling of Austria and the South Slavs by a nation which already has all the access to sea which it can conceivably require. The authors of the note clearly had this in mind, and the phrase about international agreements suggests that they may be thinking about a free port at Trieste.

It suggests even more strongly the possibility of a neutralized Dardanelles. Perhaps the most dramatic omission of the note is in the reference to Constantinople: "The expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire" has a very different sound from "the establishment of the Russian Empire at Constantinople." The Allies recognize Russia's claim to passage of the Dardanelles, but with the utmost care they do not commit themselves to the claim of possession.

The same deliberate caution is evident in the reference to the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary. "The liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians and of Tchech-Slavs from foreign domination," are the words. Now what can the liberation of the Tchech-Slavs mean? An independent kingdom of Bohemia, containing 35 per cent. of Germans, wedged in between Austria and Germany, without access to the sea, with no possibility of economic independence? Clearly not. What the note must mean is local autonomy in the Central European system, home rule perhaps with proportional representation in a federalized Austria-Hungary. That too could be regarded as liberation from foreign domination. Nor does the note say anything about a new South Slav state consisting of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. It says Serbia and Montenegro must be restored, and the Slavs (in Austria-Hungary no doubt) freed from foreign domination. This too may mean autonomy within a federalism. The note says nothing about the separation of Armenians, Arabs and Syrians from Turkish rule. It speaks of their "enfranchisement," which may just as well mean an autonomy guaranteed perhaps by an international protectorate over Turkey.

In other words, the Allies have adopted a most successful formula containing a very wide margin of possible meaning. It is a flexible statement with an upper rather than a lower limit, within which statesmanship has plenty of room to turn round unembarrassed by commitments which are definite and unambiguous. For the purpose of the war the formula can be used to evoke the maximum of irredentism within Central Europe, for the purposes of the peace it can be employed to make a settlement which considers not only nationalist majorities, but the minorities as well, takes into account the economic factors which modify the principle of nationalities, and allows full scope for super-national machinery and agreement.

At that the terms are drastic, for at a minimum they imply the cession of some territory, a reorganization of the Dual Monarchy, the destruction of the Turkish Empire as a Power, the break-up of the Berlin-Bagdad project, and a humiliating confession of defeat by the Central Empires. Severe as the proposals are, there is written all over them an intelligent willingness to use the victory for the purpose of making Europe safer. There is no talk of crippling the Central Empires. The changes proposed, if interpreted in the moderate sense, would, coupled with the League to Enforce Peace,

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be in no sense a blow at the existence of either Germany or Austria-Hungary. Such reorganization plus the guaranties would probably create a very much healthier political development of Central Europe, at once safer and more liberal. Nothing, for example, would make Germany and Austria so secure as an internationalization of the Straits and the road to Bagdad. German imperialism and pride would suffer now, but the German people would not have to look forward to another conflict with Russia.

It may well be that the whole of this program cannot be realized in the settlement at the end of the war. Much of it depends upon the ascendancy of a mood unlike those which war engenders. Nevertheless just over the horizon one can see by straining his eyes something new in the society of nations: a Germany absorbed into liberalism, an Austria-Hungary tending to be a larger Switzerland, that is to say, a state of many nations, a Balkan confederation under international guaranties, a denationalized cross-road at the Dardanelles, a Britain which had become a federation of liberal states, and the United States with Pan-America at its back a stabilizing force upon the relation of the Powers. It is a world in which the old notions of independence, sovereignty, nationality are radically altered; a world in which the over-simple distinctions between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs no longer holds. The program of the Allies is unworkable by men who bring to the task the old intellectual apparatus of statecraft, and it is not surprising that the German Emperor and so many editors the world over should read the program as if it were the usual literal demand for access of territory.

It would not be surprising if many who signed the note were unaware of or hostile to its liberal possibilities. But that the authors themselves had them in mind there can hardly be any question. The internal evidence is, it seems to us, conclusive. The language is so delicate and ingenious, so cautiously experimental and problematic that only western and liberal and inventive minds could actually have written it. They have opened a wide vista of reorganization in spite of the staggering complications of their problem. So long as the formulæ they have laid down can be taken in the liberal and not in the *Daily Graphic* interpretation of their meaning, the Allies will have renewed democratic allegiance to their cause. That allegiance will be immeasurably strengthened, of course, when Britain applies to Ireland the principle she advocates for Bohemia, and still more strengthened when assurances come from Russia that she too recognizes the existence of oppressed nationalities which must be enfranchised.

Above all, it is necessary to remember that there is a relationship between the promises made and the cost of realizing them. The campaign this spring will throw light on that question.

The Power of the Pen

THE minority of Americans who are still seeking a justification for President Wilson's recent note to the belligerent Powers can derive it from an inspection of its consequences. Let them compare the answers submitted respectively by Paris and Berlin. The answer of Berlin was unsatisfactory. The German government may well have had sufficient reasons, as the recent statement of Dr. Zimmermann indicates, for refusing to state in detail its definite proposals for territorial rearrangements. It may even have had a sufficient reason for refusing to indicate the general basis in principle of a conference about peace. But if it was sincere and intelligent in opening negotiations, it had no excuse for refusing those specific assurances about the foundations of a future international order which liberals all over the world are demanding of them. It had no excuse for ignoring those very real apprehensions about the security of nations with which the violation of Belgium infected the minds both of enemy and neutral peoples. As so often in the past it failed to adjust its diplomacy to the realities of public opinion outside of Germany. The curt postponement of any discussion of guaranties for general security until after the signature of a treaty of peace effectually killed the interest created by the overture of the Germans in the minds of most liberals; it supplied their enemies with an iron-clad reason for refusing to enter a conference; and it cast doubt upon the good faith of their whole peace negotiation. Finally it offered to their enemies an opportunity of confirming an already good reputation by a more intelligent attempt to meet the requirements of liberal and neutral public opinion. The opportunity was fortunately turned to good account. In spite of the essential ambiguity of their specific terms, the nine Allied governments have expressed a lively and an immediate interest in the organization of a better international order, and they have promised to insert in the treaty of peace certain international institutions, designed to guarantee full security and liberty of economic development for all nations, great and small.

Mr. Wilson's démarche, instead of doing harm to the cause of the great Alliance, as so many of its purblind American friends hastily assumed, has enabled its spokesmen to enhance in the eyes of all liberals the strength of the Allied position. Un-

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like the Germans, they accepted the challenge of the President and made great progress in defining the means whereby they proposed to accomplish their declared objects. The challenge was calculated to have this beneficial result, just in so far as the principles and purposes of the Allied peoples were intrinsically superior to those of the Central Powers. In protesting both that nothing was to be gained by a further definition of objects and that the objects needed no further definition, American pro-Allies were doing a dubious service to France and Great Britain. Their attitude seems to have been dictated either by an uneasy conscience as to the probable nature of the Allied answer or merely by the instinctive horror of the perfect hyphenate at the danger which Mr. Wilson had incurred of giving possible offense to their friends in Europe. As the event proved, the objects of the Allies were capable of more exact and fruitful definition, and a substantial benefit has already accrued from furnishing the Allied governments with a pretext for disclosing them. Now that their purposes have been partly uncovered and promise so much in the way of an improved international organization, while the German purposes remain furtive and nebulous, neutral opinion will agree as to the desirability for the present of continuing to fight.

The success of Mr. Wilson's note in accomplishing this useful result should remove much of the initial misunderstanding of the President's object in writing it. Both in this country and abroad there was in the beginning a conspiracy of misinterpretation. The bills of the English newspapers which translated the intention of the note into "Wilson urges peace" and "America says stop the war" perverted the truth. They had no excuse for imputing to Mr. Wilson a wish to promote "premature peace" or to help the Germans to cash in on their immediate superiority of military position. The President fully understood how much his interference could and could not accomplish. He knew the Allies would unhesitatingly and properly refuse to stop the war for the purpose of entering into a peace conference; he knew that they would almost certainly refuse to enter a conference even though the war continued; he understood the grave obstacles to an exact definition of proposed or desired territorial rearrangements. Because he knew all this, he did not suggest either mediation or a conference. But he also understood, as his critics did not, the great need and the possible benefit of bringing pressure to bear upon both groups of belligerents for a more exact definition of the method whereby they would provide for future international security and for comparatively permanent peace. This matter of common security was one in which neutrals had reason to be interested, almost as much as the belligerents; it was one which the spokesmen of the European Powers always placed on the headlines of their propaganda; it was by all odds the most momentous and difficult issue raised by the war; and yet it was an object which was rendered unreal and even dangerous by the imperfections of its definition. As long as the object of belligerent nations was limited to providing for their own security without regard to that of their enemies, their insistence upon guaranties for the future as a condition of peace could only serve as a pretext for continuing the war. Some way must be devised of breaking out of this circle. President Wilson found it by putting to a crucial test the claim of all the belligerents that they were fighting a defensive war. By asking them to divulge the means whereby they proposed not only to promote their own security but to add an additional measure of security to the common stock, he was transmuting pretexts for war into the very substance of a significant international dialogue.

The application of the test might have resulted in several different ways. It might have been evaded by both groups of belligerents, in which case both might have been suspected of concealing plans of national aggrandizement under more or less specious pleas about the necessity of self-defense. It might have been accepted by both groups of belligerents, in which case the methods proposed by each of them could have been analyzed and compared, an illuminating discussion started and perhaps maintained between them. Finally one group might have answered in some detail, while the other might have shirked the test, in which case neutrals would have inevitably drawn an inference unfavorable to the shirker. This third result is the one which has actually occurred. Germany has shirked, while the Allies have only dodged. The German negotiators evidently guessed that the Allies would shirk, too, but they guessed wrong. Their misplay has placed them in a situation from which they must needs be extricated, in case the dialogue is to be continued; and since it should be continued it is Mr. Wilson's business to supply them with some means of regaining standing in the court of international opinion.

He is likely, consequently, to find some way of conveying to the Central Powers the impossibility of their present situation. Their peace overture has remained suspended in the air, because moderate people both in enemy and neutral countries cannot take any stock in their sincerity until they satisfy the prevailing demand for specific guaranties against future aggression. Unless they are ready to define such guaranties, the responsibility for continuing the war will not be fastened on the nations which do not abandon resistance to aggres-

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sion, but upon those who made it necessary. "It must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." On the record as it exists, the Germans have not fulfilled the conditions which the public opinion of the world considers essential; and if they should begin an unlimited submarine war against commerce with no better pretext than they have yet created, they would only add to the number of their enemies, the stubbornness of the resistance, and the penalties of an ultimately certain defeat.

The Allies have done much to clarify their objects and to confirm the sympathy and support of neutrals; but they also can fairly be asked to do somewhat more. Now that the peace overture has failed, the governments of the Central Powers are trying to make capital out of the failure with their own people. They interpret the proposed terms of the Allies as a threat to the independence and security of the Central Empires, and in this way they expect to reconcile public opinion at home to a still larger measure of privation and suffering. They may succeed, because the response of the Allies in spite of its merits was ambiguous in one important respect. It can be interpreted to mean either minor and justifiable changes in the map or drastic and doubtful changes. It can be interpreted either as a plan to promote security merely by a shift in the balance of power for the benefit of the Allies, or by the establishment in Europe of a balance of organized justice. We understand the practical difficulties of clearing up this ambiguity under existing conditions; and if it is cleared up at all it will only be by slow approaches. But unless it is cleared up in the end, Mr. Wilson's great enterprise will have only partly succeeded. German liberals are entitled to assurances still more specific and comprehensive than those contained in the Allied note; and as the dialogue continues they must be obtained. Otherwise, it will be easy to convince the German people that they cannot obtain a just peace and the Allies will be losing much of the advantage of the blockade, which consists in the remorseless wearing away of the support given to the war by the civil population of Central Europe. That the dialogue will be resumed and the assurances eventually obtained is made probable by the large measure of success which has attended Mr. Wilson's first offense.

In spite of the vindication and exposure of the President's purpose, many Americans still misinterpret the plan and are blind to the result. What the President has already accomplished by his initiative and what he is likely to accomplish hereafter to a still greater extent is the gathering and piecing together, both inside and outside of the belligerent countries, of an effective international public opinion. He is aiming to provide for such opinion something substantial in the way of issues and ideas on which to chew. There was a danger, there is still a danger, that the two groups of belligerents will be so obsessed by their own interests, sufferings, dangers and sacrifices, that they will lose sight of the limits within which these sufferings and sacrifices can be profitably expended. There is a danger that they will become so preoccupied with the machinery of the war and the desire for victory that in the effort to obtain victory, they will cease to relish its most nourishing fruits. The best safeguard against this danger is the kind of a diplomatic campaign which Mr. Wilson has started, and which consists essentially in the promotion of critical pamphleteering into an agency of international diplomacy. If the President can keep the pamphlets flying, he may in the end accomplish his object of clearing the moral atmosphere; he may build a platform on which the belligerents can ultimately assemble for the discussion of specific peace terms. He may do even more than that. He may succeed in clarifying the relation between this awful expenditure of human energy and suffering and the purposes for which the expenditure is ostensibly being made. He may succeed in helping the world to reap the benefit in institutions and in experience of the stupendous calamity of the present war.

Beyond Arbitration

PUBLIC opinion is turning to arbitration in the faith that it offers a permanent solution of the labor problem. There seems to be a growing belief that if employers and employees can only be brought together in conference they will discover a community of interest before which hostilities will vanish. President Wilson has greatly strengthened this faith by his naïve assertion that at the bottom the interests of capital and labor are the same, and by his proposal of compulsory investigation as a solution of the labor problem on the railroads. Is this faith justified by the facts of experience?

Probably the most thoroughgoing American experiment in industrial arbitration is that which has been carried on during the past six years under the Protocol in the needle trades. The Protocol differed from the ordinary collective agreement in that it established a permanent system of courts for the judicial accommodation of labor controversy. During the first years of its operation it brought peace into the industry and so effectively promoted the interests of both manufacturers and operatives that it was widely heralded as the "most significant attempt ever made in the United States to harmonize the conflicting interests of

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employers and employees." It spread from the women's cloak and suit industry, where it originated, to many other branches of the needle trade; it spread triumphantly from New York to Chicago, Philadelphia and Boston. The federal government gave it wide publicity through a series of laudatory bulletins. Many experts voiced their conviction that through adaptation to other industries this carefully conceived scheme of voluntary arbitration would become a permanent factor in the promotion of industrial peace and efficiency in America.

But during the past year the Protocol has been under fire from the very men who were supposed to be its principal beneficiaries. Last spring, the cloak and suit manufacturers resorted to a lockout of sixty thousand employees in order to destroy it. During the past two months it has been crumbling under a strike forced by the manufacturers in the men's garment trade, where it had only begun to take root. And at this moment, the workers on the ladies' dress and waist industry, where it has reached its highest development, are making a losing fight to save it from the determined hostility of their employers. In the industry where most was expected of it arbitration has signally failed.

To what is this failure due?

Before 1910, when the Protocol was inaugurated, endlessly recurring strikes had kept the needle trades in perpetual turmoil. The manufacturers had been unable to establish law and order in their industry, they had shown themselves incapable of pacifying their labor. The Protocol created an elaborate system of courts through which the workers were enabled to secure redress of their grievances without resort to strike. Before 1910, sweating was the rule in the needle trades; prevailing wages were low and sanitary conditions barbarous. The workers agreed to forego their legal right to strike on the assurance of the Board of Arbitration, of which Justice Louis D. Brandeis was the first chairman, that, within the limits of the "fair and reasonable," there should be a "constant improvement in the conditions of their employment." During the first years of the Protocol there was a marked improvement in wages and sanitary conditions. Labor was pacified. And this pacification of labor, this protection of the industry from the interruptions of strikes, enabled the manufacturers to increase their profits without any radical improvement in their methods of shop or sales management.

Under peace and prosperity, the workers learned the advantage of organization. Their unions grew from a membership of hundreds until they included the great majority of all the permanent employees in the industry. Their bargaining power immensely increased and they began to interpret "fair and reasonable" in the light of the prevailing conception of a decent standard of living, which was at least twice as high as the prevailing wages in the trade.

But long before the improvement in the condition of the workers had reached the level of this prevailing conception of a decent standard of living, the manufacturers began to complain that a further increase in wages would ruin their business. This the workers refused to believe. They insisted that the manufacturers were greedy for profits and they pointed in proof to certain of the employers who, while complying with the most advanced protocol standards, were nevertheless steadily increasing the net returns on their business. And yet the contention of the manufacturers was in the main true, because to make money under the constantly improved conditions of labor which the Protocol imposed required a higher degree of business and managerial efficiency than many of them possessed. Ground between the upper millstone of the cloth manufacturers and the nether millstone of the department stores and mail-order houses, they were not efficient enough to make profits without underpaying and overworking their employees. Many of them ceased being independent manufacturers; some of them became submanufacturers, contractors, jobbers; some of them were driven out of the business altogether. More and more manufacturers refused to comply with the decisions of the Board of Arbitration. Noncompliances bred local shop strikes. In spite of the Protocol, unrest spread throughout the industry until the entire machinery of arbitration went down before the lockout and strike of 1916, the most protracted and disastrous in the history of the cloak and suit trades.

The Mayor's Council of Conciliation which in the summer of 1915 succeeded the Board of Arbitration in the cloak and suit industry, and the Board of Arbitration in the ladies' dress and waist industry, where Judge Julian W. Mack succeeded Justice Louis D. Brandeis as chairman, were quick to perceive that if the reasonable demands of the workers were to be granted without driving many of the manufacturers to the wall, the machinery for the adjustment of disputes must be supplemented by a machinery which would help the employers to improve their financial methods and their technique of shop and sales management. The Council of Conciliation proposed a board of standards, the object of which was not only to equalize conditions of labor throughout the industry, but also to introduce standard methods of record and accounting and to place at the com-

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mand of the manufacturers scientific experts who would help them to modernize their business practices. But the employers in the cloak and suit industry regarded this proposal as an undue infringement upon the privacy of their business and refused to adopt it. The employers in the ladies' dress and waist industry, however, did accept the proposal; but the moment the scientific experts began to uncover the primitive and slipshod business practices that characterized many of the shops they too rebelled. The strike that is brewing in the dress and waist industry is largely due to the attempt of the workers to compel their employers to adopt some elements of scientific management, without which the reasonable demands of the employees for better wages and improved working conditions cannot be met.

The history of the Protocol reveals the weakness of all schemes of arbitration that have been attempted, whether in Canada, Australia, Norway, Denmark, or the United States; it also reveals the weakness of President Wilson's proposals for the maintenance of industrial peace on our railroads. They all assume that labor can be pacified if its demands are rationalized and kept within the bounds of the "fair and reasonable." They assume that all employers are entirely capable of meeting these fair and reasonable demands once they are clearly defined. They take no sufficient account of the fact that the average employer is a man with very limited mastery of the science of business management, and that his unaided capacity for meeting the reasonable demands of labor is surprisingly slight. The investigations of the United States Public Health Service show that in our principal industries four-fifths of the adult male workers who were heads of families are paid less than enough to keep themselves and their families in normal health and decency. The annual wages in the needle trades in New York to-day are estimated at less than one-half of what Dr. Chapin, whose studies for the Sage Foundation were made in 1908, found to be the least that would enable families to "get food enough to keep soul and body together, and clothing and shelter enough to meet the most urgent demands of decency."

This accounts for the high morbidity among garment workers and the high death rate among their infants and children. It accounts for the constant labor unrest in the trade. But it is absurd to assume that the employers pay low wages because they are heartlessly greedy for profits. Most of them would gladly pay living wages if they knew how. But the average garment manufacturer, like the average employer in our "principal American industries" does not know how; he is ignorant of the science of business management, incompetent, inefficient. And yet he is too jealous of his status as a private business man to want to be helped from outside.

In this matter of the labor problem we are passing through the same experience through which we passed in the matter of the regulation of sanitary conditions and fire hazards, and the prevention of industrial injuries in our factories. There were always a few manufacturers capable of maintaining model establishments just as there are some manufacturers in the needle trades who are able to pay fair wages and yet prosper. But the great majority of the employers were either unwilling or unable to maintain safe factories, so that we found it necessary to enact factory laws to compel them to comply with minimum standards. But we did not stop with compulsion. It is now the rule for state industrial commissions to employ experts to show manufacturers how to make their factories safe. If the state is to compel the workers to submit to arbitration it will have to extend its control to the business methods of employers. Arbitration as it is practised is one-sided; it aims at the pacification of labor without providing for the improvement in business technique without which the reasonable demands of labor cannot be satisfied.

The history of the Protocol is a clear demonstration that the problem of industrial peace is primarily a problem of business organization. Public opinion in America is gradually accepting the theory that a decent living wage is essential to national security. An industry that fails to pay adequate wages and give reasonable continuity of employment is not an asset, but a public menace. If the public wants industrial peace it must impose upon employers minimum standards of business efficiency as it has already imposed upon them minimum standards of safety and sanitation.

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The Bagdad Corridor

AS the war progresses, we are beginning to hear more and more of the "Bagdad Corridor." Yet even now probably few people recognize how central a factor it is in the conduct of the war and in the conditions of peace. The truth is that modern warfare, being an essentially economic struggle, is not concerned so much with the possession of places as with the control of routes.

The essence of successful business is the exploitation of large fields. Up till now the business of Europe has been divided between trade with America and trade with the Middle and Far East. In the latter field the decisive factor has been the great trade route which runs through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. But Europe is at present faced, among other things, by the sudden increase in size of the field exploited in trade with the East, owing to the opening up of districts which are not indeed new, but have suddenly regained their importance after they had been forgotten or grown effete. For this reason the new trade route traversing the Middle East overland from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea and so linking up with the railway system of Central Europe is of cardinal importance and its control is one of the great prizes for which the nations of Europe are contending.

Fully to recognize this requires a glance into past history. Professor Simkhovitch showed recently that perhaps the most prominent factor in the break-up of the Roman Empire was the impoverishment of the soil in the Mediterranean lands and in the Middle East by constant unscientific agriculture. The result was that the richest spots of the old world—Mesopotamia and Asia—became poor and useless. Even Egypt suffered. But in our own time we have found means to refresh effete soil. British engineers reported less than ten years ago that Mesopotamia could easily be made once more one of the most productive countries in the world, and the same is true of other districts in the Middle East. When we reflect that a route has now been opened from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, thus making practical the reorganization and commercial development of these districts, it is easy to see that there is now in existence a new field of business, and that the possessor of the route which taps it will be in a position to exploit it successfully. The route naturally will spread its tentacles throughout all the Middle East. But it is forced by geographical necessity to concentrate in two nodes, one at Constantinople, where it joins the Central European tracks, and one at the Cilician Gates, where alone the Taurus can be passed; and it ends for the present at the ports of the Persian Gulf, though an extension to Afghanistan and British India may perhaps prove a possibility in the course of the next fifty years.

That the belligerents are fighting for this route, and will refuse to stop until its possession is settled, ought to be clear, for it has often been pointed out, though the fact is obscured by the woes of Poland, Belgium and Serbia. It may, however, be suggested that the nature of the peace conditions which are said to be contemplated by the belligerents draws attention to the importance attached by all the chancelleries of Europe to the control of this trade route.

Germany apparently is willing to be generous in the west if Poland, the Balkan States, and Mesopotamia remain either as independent buffer states or under her control. Buffer states between what? The answer obviously is, that they are between the overland route from Berlin to the Persian Gulf and any possible aggressor, safeguarding it from attacks and providing it with a fine zone of territory to be tapped by it and by it alone.

On the other hand, what do the Allies want? Not merely the restoration of Belgium and of Serbia, which they could probably obtain without further fighting, but the control of Constantinople and Mesopotamia. The terms are natural if it is regarded as axiomatic that the trade route from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf must belong to one side or the other, for the prize is a great one and it is ridiculous to suppose that either side would be justified in surrendering it to the other.

But for Americans it is especially worth consideration what the result will be if either of the belligerents succeeds in imposing its own terms. If the Central Powers win, a period of deadly competition must ensue between the Constantinople-Persian Gulf route and the Suez Canal route. Political pressure and protective tariffs will be exploited to the uttermost, and the legitimate profits of each route will suffer by the undertaking of unprofitable trade in order to prevent the other from benefiting. Incidentally it will probably involve a high degree of the nationalization of trade, for the state control which has proved efficient in military war will probably be found equally desirable in economic war. If the Allies win, they will hold the complete control of the Suez Canal route, and will control the other as far west as

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Constantinople. They will have all the advantages of a trust controlling the trade with the Middle East, but the disadvantage of being unable or of refusing to use the natural overland route from Constantinople to the North Sea. Constantinople in the hands of Russia would be a point at which the trade of the overland route was trans-shipped to the Mediterranean route in order to avoid benefiting the tracks of Central Europe, instead of being the most important junction on the direct route between the Middle East and the Atlantic coast.

The disadvantage to the Central Powers is obvious. They will not receive their natural proportion of carrying trade and will not be able to trade except on sufferance with the Middle East. The result to the Allies, and ultimately the disadvantage to neutrals, will be that they will become a conspiracy in restraint of trade.

It may well be doubted whether there can be any permanence in such a situation. The truth is that each route has its advantages and that the general good of all nations, including America, demands the development of the new trade route by international coöperation, and in combination rather than in competition with the Suez Canal. Neither party in the present war can really exploit the overland route to its full capacity except with the coöperation of the other. If the Central Powers win, they cannot afford to have no dealings with British India. If the Allies win, they cannot use the route to real advantage without its continuation through the territory of the Central Powers. If a policy of economic war is to be pursued, it must lead to further military wars in the future in which the Central Powers will look forward to the conquest of British India, and the Allies to the complete destruction of Germany. Only the criminally insane can regard such a possibility as tolerable.

Moreover, America is far more closely involved than might appear. It would be an exaggeration to say that the struggle for the Near East and the overland route to the Middle East produced the present war. But it was a great factor in so doing, and without it there would probably have been no war. Therefore, it is clear that the struggle for a new trade line parallel in part to the Suez route may produce a great war. But unless an economic as well as a political peace be made, these two parallel routes will be prolonged across the Atlantic. The British line will go to Halifax. The present diversion of sailings has more than a temporary significance, for it ought not to be forgotten that some at least of the present British government have always been the exponents of the policy of a Zollverein for the British Empire. The German line will go to the United States. There is already in existence a prolongation of both these Atlantic lines across the North American continent which link them up with the Far East.

If economic war is to continue, these great world trade routes will act as induction coils, generating ill feeling throughout their whole length. The possibility is not one which we can afford to regard complacently, and the efforts of our diplomats ought to be directed to securing economic even more than military peace.

K. Pool.

Much Ado About Lawson

However seriously the country took the "peace leak," the investigation instituted by the House Committee on Rules has not been a dignified performance. It is interesting not because it attracted widespread attention, or because the Secretary of State was subpoenaed as a witness, but because it has revealed dramatically to the country the character of a congressional investigation. The string of useless questions, the mock gravity of the investigators, their failure to realize what they were investigating—these characteristics, common to all committee hearings of Congress, have been shown through the magnifying glass of public attention.

On the first day of the hearings perhaps five hundred people went to see "Tom" Lawson. They went as they might go to a circus, crowding around the witness, standing on chairs in the background. The investigating committee, fully aware of the part it was playing, sat behind a long table on a platform at one end of the room. Since the audience was forbidden to smoke, most of the committeemen puffed large cigars. Each had a yellow tablet before him, on which he wrote anxiously the testimony which did not seem to bear directly upon the case. "The peace note was sent to all belligerent and neutral nations," said Secretary Lansing. Each committeeman worked earnestly at his yellow pad. "It would not have been courteous to divulge the contents of the note before it had been delivered to the foreign powers." Scratch—scratch—scratch—went the pencils. It was a perpetual game of hide-and-seek, with the investigators always behind and constantly losing ground. Now and then they stopped in bewilderment and took a fresh start. No one would read the notes they made. Probably they would be unable to read them themselves. But the congressional hearing, especially if it is well attended, demands a great show of deliberation on the part of the usually unimportant congressman, now become a leading figure in the play.

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The cross-examination of the Secretary of State was an important matter. Every examiner was certain to be quoted all over the country if he asked questions enough. In that respect the hearing was unusual. But in the nature of the questions asked, and the complete stupidity which each examiner confused with the proper judicial attitude, there was nothing to distinguish this cross-examination from those that have been held on military training, federal incorporation and other matters. Mr. Lansing began his testimony with a matter-of-fact account of the note's history. It had been received from the White House at four o'clock on Tuesday afternoon. The Secretary had called in Solicitor Polk and Mr. Woolsey, the chief law adviser attached to his office. After they had discussed the method of despatching the note it was turned over to the telegraphers. It was decided to make the note public on Thursday, allowing two days for it to reach the far-away countries.

This ended Mr. Lansing's direct testimony, and the cross-examination began. Mr. Henry, chairman of the committee, asked Mr. Lansing what time the note had been received from the White House. Mr. Lansing replied at four o'clock on Tuesday afternoon. Mr. Henry inquired who had been called in to discuss the method of its dispatch. Mr. Lansing replied that he had called in Solicitor Polk and Mr. Woolsey, the chief law adviser attached to his office. Mr. Henry continued conscientiously until, amid much note-taking, he had made a complete aura of Mr. Lansing's direct testimony. This concluded his cross-examination, and gave the floor to Mr. Campbell, who had been tugging at the leash. Mr. Campbell, now the center of all eyes, sprang into the breach. At what time, if you please, did Mr. Lansing receive the note from the White House? Who did he call in to discuss the method of its dispatch? And all this time the official stenographer was actually taking down a record of the proceedings.

By the time the thimble had got around to Mr. Chiperfield, at the right end of the table, new facts had been brought to light. It developed that Mr. Lansing had a confidential clerk—a Mr. R. C. Sweet. New scratching of pencils. R. *C.* or R. *B.*? General craning of necks over neighbors' pads. It also developed that Mr. Polk had a confidential clerk and that Mr. Woolsey had a confidential clerk. Furthermore, the note had been sent to forty-three belligerent and neutral nations. "Can you," asked Mr. Chiperfield, "give an idea as to the location of these countries without naming them?" And that also was recorded by the official stenographer. "They are in Europe, South America, Central America, Asia and Africa," said Mr. Lansing. A fresh outburst of note-taking.

"Each of these foreign Powers has the ability to de-code our secret dispatches?" asked Mr. Chiperfield.

"They are de-coded by our own diplomatic officials," replied Mr. Lansing.

"It amounts to the same thing," said Mr. Chiperfield thoughtfully.

And that, too, the stenographer put down in his book.

The questions did not always come so spontaneously. Now and then the gentleman who held the thimble was nudged by his neighbor and a whispered consultation took place. It was like a football team with its signals crossed. Apparently it did not disconcert Mr. Lansing, but it was at least embarrassing for the onlookers. Then the query would come: What time, Mr. Secretary, did you receive the note from the White House?

The investigation had its high spots, however. Toward the end of Mr. Lansing's testimony, Mr. Chiperfield, who had been asking the Secretary whom he had called in to discuss the method of despatching the note, took a new tack. "What time were the notes delivered in the foreign countries?" he asked.

"There were forty-three of them," replied Mr. Lansing. "It would be impossible to say what time they were delivered."

"Approximately what time?"

"I couldn't say."

"The day, then, Mr. Secretary?"

"The eighteenth."

At this point Mr. Chiperfield took on stature. One might have thought he was about to cut the Gordian knot. Amid a silence that was chilling he leaned forward impressively and asked:

"Of December?"

One can never be too careful about the months—and the stenographer put down another question to Mr. Chiperfield's credit.

Five or six years ago there was a play in New York called "The Pink Lady." What plot it had concerned a merchant who had lost a rare bowl, and now offered the hand of his daughter as a reward to the finder. An applicant appeared.

"You have found my bowl?" asked the merchant.

"I believe I have."

"Describe it," said the merchant.

"Well, it is elliptical—and the four seasons are painted on its sides."

"Ah! but can you name them?" demanded the merchant.

"Spring," said the young man with a good deal of care, "summer, fall and winter."

I have forgotten whether the old merchant ever recovered his bowl, but I remember that he gave

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away his daughter. He may still be playing the small cities of the West. "The Pink Lady" was a great success. But if he is without employment he might come to Washington. He had a true eye for Congressional investigation.

CHARLES MERZ.

Odilon Redon

WITH the passing of this rare artist during the late summer months, we are conscious of the silencing of one of the foremost lyricists in painting, one of the most delicate spirits among those who have painted pictures so thoroughly replete with charm, pictures of such real distinction and merit. For of true charm, of true grace, of true melodic, Redon was certainly the master. I think no one has coveted the vision so much as, certainly no more than, has this artist, possessed of the love of all that is dreamlike and fleeting in the more transitory aspect of earthly things. No one has ever felt more that fleeting treasure abiding in the moment, no one has been more jealous of the bounty contained in the single glancing of the eye upward to infinity or downward among the minuter fragments at his feet.

It would seem as if Redon had surely walked amid gardens, so much of the morning is in each of his fragile works. There seems always to be hovering in them the breath of those recently spent dawns of which he was the eager spectator, never quite the full sunlight of the later day. Essentially he was the worshiper of the lip of flower, of dust upon the moth wing, of the throat of young girl, or brow of young boy, of the sudden flight of bird, the soft going of light clouds in a windless sky. These were the gentle stimulants to his most virile expression. Nor did his pictures ever contain more; they never struggled beyond the quality of legend, at least as I know them. He knew the loveliness in a profile, he saw always the evanescences of light upon light and purposeless things. The action or incident in his pictures was never more than the touch of some fair hand gently and exquisitely brushing some swinging flower. He desired implicitly to believe in the immortality of beauty, that things or entities once they were beautiful could never die, at least for him. I followed faithfully for a time these fine fragments in those corners of Paris where they could be found, and there was always sure to be in them, always and ever that perfect sense of all that is melodic in the universe.

I do not know much of his early career as an artist. I have read passages from letters which he wrote not so long ago, in which he recounts with tenderness the dream life of his childhood, how he used to stand in the field for hours or lie quietly upon some cool hill shaded with young leaves, watching the clouds transforming themselves into wing shapes and flower shapes, staining his fancy with the magic of their delicate color and form—indeed, it would seem as if all things had for him been born somewhere in the clouds and had condescended to an earthward existence for a brief space, the better to show their rarity of grace for the interval. Although obviously rendered from the object, they were still-lifes which seemed to take on a kind of cloud life during the very process of his creation. They paid tribute to that simple and unaffected statement of his—"I have fashioned an art after myself." Neither do I know just how long he was the engraver and just how long he was the painter—it is evident everywhere that his line is the line of the fastidious artist on steel and stone.

Beyond these excessively frail renderings of his whether in oil or in pastel, I do not know him, but I am thinking always in the presence of them that he listened very attentively and with more than a common ear to the great masters in music, absorbing at every chance all that was in them for him. He had in his spirit the classical outline of music, with nothing directly revolutionary, no sign of what we call revolt other than the strict adherence to personal relationship, no other prejudice than the artist's reaction against all that is not really refined in art, with but one consuming ardor, and that to render with extreme tranquillity everything delicate and lovely in passing things. There is never anything in his pictures outside the conventional logic of beauty, and if they are at all times ineffably sweet, it is only because Redon himself was like them, joyfully living out the days because they were for him ineffably sweet, too. Most of all it is Redon who has rendered with exceptional elegance and extreme artistry, the fragment.

It is in his pictures, replete with exquisiteness, that one finds the true analogy to lyric poetry. This lyricism makes them seem mostly Greek—often I have thought them Persian, sometimes again, Indian; certainly he learned something from the Chinese in their porcelains and in their embroidery. I am sure he has been fond of these outer influences, these Oriental suggestions which were for him the spiritual equivalent from the past for his spontaneous ideas, for he, too, had much of all this magic, as he had much of the hypnotic quality of jewelry and precious stones in all his so delicate pictures, firelike in their subtle brilliancy. They have always seemed to contain this suggestion for me: flowers that seemed to be

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much more the embodiment of jades, rubies, emeralds, and ambers, than just flowers from the common garden. His flamelike touches have always held this preciousness: notations rather for the courtly robe or diadem than just drawings. All this gift of goldsmithery comes as one would expect, quite naturally, from his powers as an engraver, in which art he held a first place in his time and was the master of the younger school, especially in Belgium and Germany. Of all the painters of this time it is certain that he was first among them essaying to picture the jewelled loveliness of nature; it is most evident in LaTouche who was in no way averse to Renoir either, but Redon has created this touch for himself and it is the touch of the virtuoso. Perhaps it would have been well if Moreau, who had a sicker love of this type of expression, had followed Redon more closely, as he might then have added a little more lustre to these very dead literary failures of his.

I cannot now say who else beside Ferdinand Knopf has been influenced greatly by him, but I do know that he was beloved by the more modern men, that he was revered by all regardless of theories or tenets, for there is in existence somewhere in Paris a volume of letters and testimonials celebrating some anniversary of Redon in proof of it. And I think that—regardless of ideas—the artist must always find him sympathetic, if for no other reason than that he was the essence of refinement, of delicacy, and of taste. When I think of Redon I think of Shelley a little, "he is dusty with tumbling about among the stars," and I think somewhat, too, of some phrases in DeBussy and his unearthly school of musicians, for if we are among those who admire sturdier things in art we can still love the fine gift of purity. And of all gifts Redon has that, certainly.

His art holds, too, something of that breathlessness among the trees one finds in Watteau and in Lancret, maybe more akin to Lancret, for he, also, was more a depicter of the ephemeral. We think of Redon as among those who transvaluate all earthly sensations in terms of a purer element. We think of him as living with his head among the mists, alert for all those sudden bursts of light which fleck here and there forgotten or unseen places, making them live with a new resplendency, full of new revealment, perfect with wonder. Happily we find in him a hatred of description and of illustration, we find these pictures to be illuminations from rich pages not observed by the common eye, decorations out of a world the like of which has been but too seldom seen by those who aspire to vision. *Chansons sans paroles* are they, ringing clearly and flawlessly to the eye as do those songs of Verlaine (with whom he has also some relationship) to the well attuned ear.

He was the master of the nuance, and the nuance was his lyricism, his special gift, his genius. He knew perfectly the true vibration of note to note, and how few are they whose æsthetic emotions are built upon the strictly poetic basis, who escape the world-old pull towards description and illustration. How few, indeed, among those of the materialistic vision escape this. But for Redon there was but one world, and that a world of imperceptible light on all things visible, with always a kind of song of adoration upon his lips, as it were, obsessed with reverence and child wonder toward every least and greatest thing, and it was in these portrayals of least things that he exposed their naked loveliness as among the greatest. Never did Redon seek for the miniature; he knew merely that the part is the representation of the whole, that the perfect fragment is a true representative of beauty, and that the vision of some fair hand or some fair eye is sure to be the epitome of all that is lovely in the individual.

We have as a result of this almost religious devotion of Redon's, the fairest type of the expression of that element which is the eye's equivalent for melodious sound. In his pictures he perpetuated his belief in the unfailing harmony in things. Either all things were lovely in his eye, or they are made beautiful by thinking beautifully of them. That was the only logic in Redon's painting. He questioned nothing; he saw the spiritual import of every object on which his eye rested. No one shall go to Redon for any kind of intellectual departure or for any highly specialized theory—it is only too evident from his work that he had none in mind. He had, I think, a definite belief in the theosophic principle of aura, in that element of emanation which would seem sometimes to surround delicate objects touched with the suffusion of soft light. For him all things seemed "possessed" by some colorful presence which they themselves could in no way be conscious of, somewhat the same sort of radiance which floods the features of some beauteous person and creates a presence there which the person is not even conscious of, the imaginative reality, in other words, existing either within or without everything the eye beholds. For him the very air which hovered about all things seemed to have, as well, the presence of color not usually seen of men, and it was this emanation or presence which formed the living quality of his backgrounds in which those wondrous flowery heads and hands and wings had their being, through which those dusty wings of most unearthly butterflies or moths hurry so feverishly. He has given us a happy suggestion of the reality of spiritual spaces and the way that

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these fluttering bodies which are little more than spirit themselves have enjoyed a beauteous life. He was Keats-like in his appreciation of perfect loveliness, like Shelley in his passionate desire to transform all local beauty into universal terms.

No one will quarrel with Redon on account of what is not in him. What we do find in him is the poetry of a quiet, sweet nature in quest always of perfect beauty, longing to make permanent by means of a rare and graceful art some of those fragments which have given him his private and personal clue to the wonders of the moment, creating a personal art by being himself a rare and lovely person. He remains for us one of the finest of artists, who has reverted those whisperings from the great world of visual melody in which he lived. It was with these exquisite fragments that he adorned the states of his own soul in order that he might present them as artist in tangible art form. We are grateful for his lyricism and for his exquisite goldsmithery. After viewing his delicately beautiful pictures, objects take on a new poetic wonder.

MARSDEN HARTLEY.

A Middle-Class Wife

I HAVE two babies; I hope they may never know how warmly at this moment I hate them. I have a husband; we were married because we were very much in love—and him I hate too. I have a large stock of relatives, and them I hate with the heart and should hate with the hand if I had not the misfortune to be well brought up. This emotion of mine, especially in connection with my spouse and offspring, is, up to the present, local and temporary; indeed I think it will not grow into a permanent hatred, but will gradually assume two peculiar forms: toward my children a passionate and slavish devotion, which will make me resent my daughters-in-law; and toward my husband regards, reasonably kind, which will be reciprocated. My feeling toward my relatives, on the other hand, is becoming quite, quite fixed.

It is all the fault of the children. I wanted children very much; I am fond of children, mentally and physically; and the sheer normality of having them I rejoice in. Furthermore, having been an only child myself, I wanted my children close together so that they might enjoy one another all the way up. I seemed to think I could have babies as easily as a geranium has red blossoms. But I find they commonly come rather hard and that I am not the only woman who for months after a baby is born has an aching body and a dull mind and a defective sense of humor. During this period one's husband is very fatherly toward one, and one begins to feel the small asp of hate nipping one's heart.

The semi-invalidated stage that I have gone through with each of my babies is well past: I am normally sturdy—I have to be. I shall not tell over the tale of the things there are to do, cooking and mending and washing and baby-tending. It happens that I relate my daily household misadventures in a way diverting to my relatives, and they think I dote on housework. A really *model* wife and mother, say my kin; so unexpected, they say, considering her *education*, and all. And when I crawl to bed at half past eight, no thought save detail of housework and child-rearing has found place in my mind all day; I have done no reading save snips from a book propped against the sink faucets while I washed dishes; and I have simply heard, not shared even mentally such stimulating conversation as my husband brings home to dinner.

I know house and children ought not to take all my day and all my strength. If I had had special training in domestic science and child-psychology and nursing I should doubtless be able to do my work in less time and with far less effort. But in college and university I flew straight in the face of providence, which is a war-name of advising relatives, and worked at mathematics, while in the spare time which I might have devoted to stray courses in home economics as a sop to the gods, I took 'cello. Furthermore, I am glad of it. If I were to have a vacation tomorrow and a financial windfall, I should take two courses in mathematics at the university, and a 'cello lesson a week, and bask in it as my sister-in-law does in chiffon underwear.

You *ought* to have help, say my relatives, and I add a verse to my hymn of hate for them. Among the qualities for which I love my husband are generosity, sensitiveness, modesty and conscientiousness, and I take it each of these characteristics has lower money-making value than the others. Some day when we have got middle-aged, we shall have the salary we need now; and just about that time our relatives will die and leave us money we could get on without. If I happened to be male instead of female, which God forfend, I could double the family income by teaching at the university, but the university does not yet see its way to employing women on its teaching staff, and I therefore scrub the square of my kitchen floor instead.

The truth is, however, that it is not a floor-scrubber and dishwasher that I desire. I could get along with that work or leave it happily undone. It is the care of two children under three that concerns me. It is unremitting and nerve-

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tearing, and the day in and day out of it is undermining mercilessly my ability to be lovable and to love. Furthermore, I have not the qualifications that would justify entrusting me with sole responsibility for the growth of human beings. Maternal instinct I have in normal amount; I could be trusted to rescue my infants from a burning building, but that is a very different matter from knowing what to do with twenty-four hours' worth of bodily and mental development every day. I do not want a nursemaid; I have no training for my job, but I have an occasional vagrant idea, and it does not appeal to me to exchange my services to my offspring for those of a hand-maiden with neither training nor ideas. The helper for me should be a trained psychologist, a child-lover, to be sure, but a child-lover with expert knowledge of the needs of growing minds. She should have also training in the treatment of the smaller physical ailments of children. She ought to cost me two thousand dollars a year, but in the present state of women's wages I have no doubt I could get her for a thousand. And I want her only half the day—five hundred dollars. Our income is sixteen hundred.

Such a woman as I have in mind, however, could take charge of a very appreciable number of children along with my important two. For five or six hours a day she could take care of a nursery-full, and still have time for life and love; while the sigh of relief that a mother breathes when she ties her son's Windsor under his chin and posts him off to school would be breathed five years earlier. Indeed she might enjoy her children, and the sigh be dispensed with. Four hours a day of freedom for us educated, reasonably intelligent, good-stock, middle-class mothers—! The possibilities are limitless. We might even have more children.

ALICE AUSTIN WHITE.

On the Basis of Nationality

WHAT territorial changes are involved in "the reorganization of Europe," according to the Allied statement of terms to President Wilson? Passing over the obvious demands for the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, and the evacuation of invaded territory in France, Russia and Rumania, we find that the note calls for a stable settlement based alike on "the principle of nationalities," the right of all nations to economic development, and military security against attack, guaranteed by "territorial agreements and international arrangements." These three factors clearly must obtain equal consideration in fixing political units with boundaries that can endure. They must underlie the interpretation of the further specific demands, to wit: "the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations" (Alsace-Lorraine, the Trentino, etc.), "the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians and of Tcheco-Slovaques from foreign domination" (involving the East Adriatic coast, the "South Slavs," some Hungarian races, and Bohemia) "the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire" (notably Armenia, and Constantinople with the Straits). The demand for the evacuation of Russian territory needs special consideration on account of the Polish question. We have to consider, therefore, six main territorial problems: Alsace-Lorraine, Italian demands in the Trentino and the Adriatic coast, Poland, Bohemia, and Turkey.

One of the best recent studies of European nationality is Arnold Toynbee's "Nationality and the War." Mr. Toynbee is a liberal Englishman who understands that the problem of nationality is as complex as it is troublesome. The most important factor is obviously the feeling of the population itself, and this may be dependent on many things, including well marked natural boundaries, language and literature, religion, and tradition of race. This actual feeling is much more to be considered than, for instance, the historical argument, which may be used to justify almost any scheme of territorial aggrandizement—as when Italian newspapers described the annexation of Tripoli as "recovering the soil of the fatherland" because Tripoli once belonged to the Roman Empire. But the feeling of nationality must be weighed with economic and military considerations, or it will make trouble. If one nation is so constituted, for instance, as to deny another access to the sea, or to threaten it with immense strategic advantages, we shall have no "stable settlement." With this understood, Mr. Toynbee outlines two main principles: first that on account of the elaborate nature of modern political machinery and on account of political habit we should disturb existing boundaries no more than necessary; second that on account of the intermingling of races there must in each case be disappointed minorities. Mr. Toynbee prefaces his remarks with the statement that the changes he suggests are dependent on an Allied victory, and that they are not utopian, but the most desirable that would be possible in the premises. It will therefore be of value as an approach to the matter to summarize those of his suggestions which come within the scope of the Allied demands.

Alsace-Lorraine. In this case the historical argument is fruitless, for the territory has frequently changed hands between France and Germany, and the decision would ultimately go back to ancient history. Mr. Toynbee proposes a plebiscite, and maintains that a fair one will be possible. The real difficulty is to adjust the units of voting so as to have as few unsatisfied minorities as possible. He first divides Lorraine, roughly speaking, by a line along the watershed between the Seille and Saar, suitable for a military and political frontier. Southwest of this line the population is mostly French-speaking, and would undoubtedly vote to reunite with France. Northeast of it the population feels a solidarity with Germany. This northeast section would have to extend eastward to the Rhine, to pre-

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

ALSACE-LORRAINE



POLAND

ITALIA IRREDENTA, SOUTH SLAV STATES, BOHEMIA, TRANSYLVANIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

Proposed boundaries are indicated by a heavy black line; present boundaries to be superseded, by a broken line. The northeast boundary of Lorraine is, of course, now within German territory

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clude any possibility of geographical separation from Germany if Alsace goes to France.

Alsatians speak German, except for a few communes high up in the Vosges; but their sympathies in the recent past have not been with Germany. Their economic interests would draw them eastward, however, since their markets lie in the Rhine valley rather than across the Vosges to the west. Alsace would have to vote as a unit, since there are no suitable lines for a frontier between the Vosges and the Rhine. The result is hard to predict, but whichever way it turned, it would insure greater permanence than an arbitrary decision. Alsace would be enthusiastically welcomed by France, but it might well prefer Germany if it were offered entrance as an enfranchised part of a powerful south-German state.

Italia Irredenta. The Trentino is inhabited principally by Italians, and there is no reason why Italy should not have it. But the section immediately beyond the present Italian border on the Adriatic is inhabited largely by Slovenes. In the northern part of this territory the people have few national traditions, have been treated well by Austria, and the towns have a German character. Trieste, on the seacoast, however, is 75 per cent Italian, as are other smaller Istrian ports. Nevertheless, Trieste is economically necessary as a seaport for the Austrian hinterland, whereas Italy has no need for such a seaport. Croatia, the next territory along the coast, contains but few Italians; and as for Dalmatia, Italy's only possible claim to it on the basis of nationality is the memory of the Venetian Empire. The South Slav peoples—Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs and Dalmatians—share the same race and language, but differ in religion. Slovenia and Croatia have belonged to Austria since 1527, and were satisfied until Croatia passed under Magyar rule in 1876, since when they have become alienated by unfair treatment. The other peoples prefer independence as a matter of course. Mr. Toynbee suggests independent states of Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia as parts of a South-Slav union, making Trieste a free port. It is probable, however, that if such a plan were not executed, he would prefer to see Trieste remain in Austria's hands. All that could be given Italy would be a tiny strip on the west bank of the Isonzo below Görz, containing the little towns of Aquileia and Grado. This would not interfere with the Tauern Railway, which connects Trieste with southern Germany through the Alps.

In order to allay Italy's fears from Austrian naval bases, Mr. Toynbee offers as a compensation for giving up Trieste the dismantling of Pola. Sebenico and Cattaro would fall within the Southern Slav states. Avlona, at present held by Italy as a base, would have to go to Albania, but it could be neutralized under international guarantees.

Poland. Poland was before the war split into three parts—the large territory of Russian Poland, Galicia or Austrian Poland, and Posen in Germany. It is taken for granted that, whichever side wins, Poland will be in some degree reunited as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of the victor. The Poles would have some reasons to prefer the Central Powers, since the Russians are Orthodox, and the Poles are Catholics; Russia is Poland's hereditary enemy and has ruthlessly oppressed her; and Galicia is one of the most favored parts of the Austrian confederation, the inhabitants having risen *en masse* against the Russian invasion at the beginning of the war. Posen, however, is a counterbalancing element, since Germany has carried out a brutal policy there directed toward the crushing of Polish nationalism. The Poles now hate Germany more than Russia, according to Mr. Toynbee. This is important, since it must be obvious to the Poles that Germany is the dominant partner in the alliance. Furthermore, in their invasion of Russian Poland the Germans have treated the Poles as a hostile population to be terrorized. Since Russian Poland has both commanding size and central position, it is the necessary nucleus of a national state, and Mr. Toynbee thinks it will prefer to cast its lot with Russia, taking with it a large part of the German Poles. Galicia must then come also unless it prefers local home rule to national unity. Mr. Toynbee believes that a Poland formed under Austro-German auspices could not include much of Posen and perhaps not even Galicia, thus storing up trouble for the future on account of disappointed nationalist ambitions.

Assuming, then, that Poland is to become virtually a part of the Russian system, the principal difficulty is drawing the western frontier. Starting from the Hungarian boundary on the Carpathians, just east of the railway connecting Sillein in Hungary with Teschen and Ratibor in Silesia, it might run eastward of the railway, along the divide between the Oder and Vistula systems, and continue in a northwest direction till it struck the Oder's right bank a few miles below Ratibor. It might then follow the Oder to a point below Oppeln, and then take a straight line slightly east of north, to the southernmost point in the province of Posen. This would exclude a rural Polish population in Silesia in order to give to Germany the German industrial towns of Oppeln, Kosel and Ratibor, but it would include the important coal-mining district around Königshütte. Mr. Toynbee thinks the division between industries and mines, thus created, could adjust itself by the opening of new coal veins in Silesia on the one hand, and the further development of industry about Lodz on the other. If no tariff wall were erected, the economic problem would not rise anyway. The division keeps in German hands the strategical command of the Moravian Gap, which is necessary for military security.

Posen is predominantly Polish except a northern fringe along the river Netze, yet strategically considered it is an arrowhead pointing at Berlin. Mr. Toynbee suggests a solution of this dilemma by annexing it to the Polish state under the provision that the fortifications of Posen city shall be dismantled and Russia shall not undertake to push her military line into the territory. As a counter-guaranty, he would have Germany dismantle her fortifications in East Prussia, east of the Vistula. (This arrangement seems one of the most impracticable of Mr. Toynbee's suggestions.) The northern boundary of the Posen section would exclude the Netze and the canal linking the Netze and the Vistula. It would also exclude the large rural Polish population in West Prussia on the west bank of the Vistula. The Germans are numerically in a majority in West Prussia, but only on account of the German city of Danzig. West Prussia, however, is a necessary part of Germany, and links the thoroughly German East Prussia with the rest of the Empire. Mr. Toynbee would exact a guaranty from Germany for just treatment of the Poles in West Prussia as to language and political equality. He would also make Danzig a free port in order to give Polish commerce access to the sea through the Vistula. East of the Vistula, the Masurian lakes form the natural boundary.

Bohemia. Bounded by a four-square range of mountains, the Bohemian provinces occupy a strategic position between Germany and the rest of Austria, in the very middle of the Central Empires. The total population is about ten million, more than all the German peoples in Austria.

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The native Tchech population of Bohemia is 65 per cent of the whole, in Moravia it is 71 per cent. It has never been thoroughly assimilated, and has long boiled with political and religious revolt. Their claim for independence would be a close parallel to a claim of the Irish Nationalists if the latter should propose complete separation of the island from the British Empire and absolute supremacy of the Catholic population. It would be a graver menace, however, for the German minority would suffer much worse oppression than would Ulster under such an arrangement. Economically, Bohemia and Moravia are great manufacturing and mining districts, absolutely dependent on free trade with Germany and Austria for their markets. Strategically, these states control the Moravian Gap, which would be a gate for a Russian invasion of the Central Empires. A wholly independent Tchech state would therefore be impossible on every count. Mr. Toynbee's solution for this problem is dependent on his suggestions for a new political structure of Germany. This would be composed of three great states of equal weight—North Germany, South Germany and Austria. He proposes that the Tchech elements should enter the Empire as a part of Austria, being first assured of home rule on the same plan as the Austrian crown lands. Such a solution might be practicable, however, if no change took place in German political organization. It would technically fit the Allied formula of "freedom from foreign domination"—which does not necessarily mean absolute independence.

The Straits and Armenia. The object of thrusting Turkey out of Europe is to insure free passage from the Black Sea to the Aegean for commerce at all times. While Turkish domination is unsatisfactory, Russian would also cause uneasiness among the Balkan states, and threaten trouble for the future, both because Bulgaria and Rumania also own Black Sea ports, and because they would fear Russia's designs on their territory for the sake of a land route to the Golden Horn. Constantinople is estimated to contain 44 per cent of Moslems, about 17 per cent each of Greeks and Armenians, 14 per cent of foreign subjects, 5 per cent of Jews, and others. It is a truly cosmopolitan city. Mr. Toynbee's boundaries here are entirely strategic. Bulgaria would receive the territory up to the international zone. In the latter—including several Greek islands—he suggests an autonomous republic on a Greek basis for the civil government. This government is to have no military powers. The Straits must be subject to an international guaranty, and garrisoned in some impartial fashion. The question of garrisoning causes him so much difficulty that he finally suggests that the United States be called in for this duty. He admits, however, that this is a *reductio ad absurdum,* which points to a necessity for a general international organization in command of force. He warns against allowing any movement to grow in the autonomous state for annexation to Greece.

The Armenians in Russia, though they have been subject to some oppression, are incomparably better off than those in Turkey. Mr. Toynbee proposes to give Russia the Armenian plateau, in which the Armenians are in a majority, and which Russia has already partially conquered. This would include Erzerum, Erzingan, Van, Bitlis and Sert. For strategic and economic reasons he would also give Russia a slice of Persia containing Lake Urumia, but we need not go into that question.

Mr. Toynbee is opposed to any further dismemberment of Turkey for the benefit of the European Powers, but he does suggest a number of internal changes which would include among their effects the protection of Syrian and other subject peoples.

The note gives indications of some action about the Hungarian problem, where under the dominant Magyar race there are numerous other elements, notably Slovaks, Rumans, Serbs and Ruthenes. Geographically, however, Hungary is a unit—with three possible exceptions—and the general situation must be met with internal reforms. The first exception is Transylvania, where Rumans form 57 per cent, Magyars 33 per cent, and Saxons 9 per cent of the population. Geographically Transylvania could be united with Rumania. Secondly, the Banat of Temesvar, in the southeastern corner of the Alföld, contains a fair proportion of Serbs, and the Magyar element is almost negligible. This could be given to Serbia if Transylvania went to Rumania, since it lies on the north of the Danube and would protect Belgrade from guns on Austrian soil. If Transylvania remains in Hungary, however, the Banat in Serbian hands would be a dangerous wedge into Austro-Hungarian territory. Thirdly, the Ruthenes, numbering less than a million, round the headwaters of the Theiss, might possibly be united to their kinsmen in Russia, though the Carpathians lie between.

Mr. Toynbee outlines a highly speculative scheme for a Balkan customs union—including the South Slav states, Bulgaria, and Rumania, to be protected from political interference by a sort of European Monroe Doctrine. He sees a possibility of Hungary joining this union, having separated from Austria, which in turn would become an integral part of the reorganized German Empire. The important consideration is that economically and racially the Balkans belong together, and the Slav states along the Adriatic must not keep each other, or Austria and Hungary, from access to the sea. This would lead to the conclusion that if no Balkan Confederation is possible, these states, even though politically independent, must fall within the economic influence of a Central Europe. It also indicates that if the economic question were solved, slight territorial rearrangements among the Balkans would be of decreasing importance for the future.

Summing up the losses of the Central Powers: Germany would lose the French part of Lorraine and perhaps Alsace to France, and Posen to Poland. Austria-Hungary would lose the Trentino to Italy, Galicia to Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia to independent governments, and possibly Transylvania to Rumania with a small square of territory to Serbia. Turkey would lose Constantinople and the Straits to an internationalized government, and Armenia to Russia. The problem involved in the Central Powers' desire for a land route to the Near East hardly receives consideration in Mr. Toynbee's book, but it furnishes an additional argument for the internationalization, rather than the Russification, of Constantinople.

This summary on account of its brevity necessarily presents an over-simplification of the problems involved. For further details and other questions the reader should consult Mr. Toynbee's book, and should remember that he offers only an informed approach to the question. Any student of the subject will probably come away with several important conclusions: that the Allied note is a highly elastic document; that rearrangement of territory on the basis of nationality is no simple and obvious nostrum for the evils of politics; that any desirable solution must involve projects which can be safely founded only on a much higher degree of international organization than now exists.

G. S.

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Responsibility for the War

On January 7th the New York *Times* published a translation of the German Chancellor's speech on the responsibility for the war. At the request of THE NEW REPUBLIC Professor Stowell has prepared the following comment on the Chancellor's statement.

IN contradiction to the views expressed by Lord Grey the German Chancellor stated what seemed to him, in the retrospect of two years, to be the final conclusion as to the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. He quoted from the instructions which were telegraphed to the German Ambassador at Vienna and gave the response of the Austro-Hungarian government contained in the instructions sent their ambassador at Berlin. The latter has already appeared in the Austrian Red Book. It is interesting to read the exact words of the Chancellor's instructions and it seems evident that he was urging upon Austria-Hungary the acceptance of Lord Grey's mediation proposal on the basis of Austria-Hungary's occupation of Belgrade. Some idea of the general nature of this note might have been surmised from the publication of the Austrian reply as given in the Red Book and the public assertion of the German government contained in the German White Book that they had urged their ally to agree to Lord Grey's proposal. The advice contained in this note, however, does not seem to have been as emphatically impressed upon Austria as the Chancellor's instructions in reference to the continuation of negotiations with Russia, published on August 1st in the *Westminster Gazette*. (See M. P. Price's "Diplomacy of the War," page 251; cf. Stowell, "Diplomacy of the War of 1914," page 224.) It does not therefore seem of any particular importance as further evidence to exculpate Germany from responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities.

Bethmann-Hollweg contends that Russia's mobilization made it impossible to adopt this proposal for mediation and rendered the war inevitable. He compares Germany's efforts toward mediation with England's failure to exert any restraining influence upon her allies and believes that Sir Edward Grey's promise of support to France and the general belief in Russia that England would be on her side explained Russia's attitude and may be considered as the cause of her precipitate mobilization. There is nothing new in all these assertions and they have been fully considered in the press and the various books which treat of the outbreak of the war.

Germany cannot deny that she took back the assurance which had previously been given that a partial Russian mobilization against Austria would not be looked upon as directed against herself. With extraordinary frankness the Austrian Red Book publishes the dispatch in which it counseled the German government to assume a menacing attitude toward Russia because of this partial mobilization and the Austrian representative at Berlin informs his government of Germany's compliance. No wonder Russia believed that Germany intended either to force a war or to isolate her from her allies and humiliate her in the face of Europe, for Russia could not possibly agree to Austria's subjugation of Serbia. From the moment when the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg "accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their [partial] mobilization," there is a change in Russia's attitude and, if we put ourselves in the place of M. Sazonoff, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, we can well understand his anxiety. In spite of the evidence which he had given of his desire to maintain the peace he must have feared lest the pacifists in France and England should influence those governments to leave him unsupported against the unjustifiable action of Austria, backed by Germany.

The war party at St. Petersburg may well have urged that since Germany gave every indication of a determination to support Austria and to refuse mediation, they must strike without delay lest public opinion in France and England should weaken and leave Russia in the lurch. Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech seems still to cherish the peculiar view that England and France should have compelled Russia to refrain from defending her vital interests while Germany herself refused to restrain Austria on the plea that she could not drag her ally before a European areopagus.

To the everlasting honor of England it must be remembered that England made it perfectly evident that she would not follow France in any aggressive action, and this was equivalent to declaring that if France should back up Russia in any aggressive action England would not stand back of her. To Germany's dishonor she refused to take a similar stand in regard to Austria-Hungary, but pleaded instead that German interests required that she should support her ally.

Speaking of the Russian mobilization the Chancellor makes a great point of a secret Russian mobilization decree of September 30th, 1912, said to have been in force at the outbreak of the war, which states " . . . the announcement of mobilization is at the same time an announcement of war against Germany." At first appearance this seems to be a strong argument to show that Russia intended war at all hazards and was unwilling to continue peace negotiations after the completion of her mobilization; but any one familiar with the European mobilization situation will understand that Germany was certain to declare war as soon as Russian mobilization commenced. Germany's trump card in the European situation was that she could mobilize most quickly and strike at her enemies while they were still in the disorganized condition incident to partial mobilization. The probability that Germany would declare war as soon as Russia commenced mobilization was so great as to amount to a practical certainty. Germany recognized and alluded to this when she excused her refusal to consider the Czar's proposal for arbitration on the ground that Russia's mobilization had commenced at the time the offer was made. The order must therefore be considered as intended to prepare the Russian forces for the war with Germany which would inevitably result from Russia's general mobilization.

The German Chancellor further blames Russia for refusing to demobilize in conformity with the German ultimatum. Quite apart from the question whether a first-class Power would be willing to endure the loss of prestige which submission to such an ultimatum would entail, it is patent that the indescribable confusion of a mobilization arrested in mid course would have left her at the

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mercy of Germany. Germany's demand for demobilization and Russia's offer of arbitration must be regarded as intended to influence public opinion and impress the popular mind with the justice of their causes.

No German statesman has ever yet explained why, when Lord Grey asked Germany to propose some method of solving the difficulty and offered to desert France and Russia if they were not willing to coöperate in any reasonable proposal to that end, no suggestion was forthcoming.

Germany had all the advantages of the diplomatic game. Austria had prepared the coup which fell without warning. Germany was in a central position. For several days she maintained an uncompromising attitude while the Powers of the Entente group busied themselves with various proposals and interchanges of views in an effort to maintain the peace. This enabled Germany to discover and take advantage of any indications of weakness or differences of opinion between the Entente powers. The whole course of diplomatic negotiations makes perfectly evident that Germany intended to disrupt the cordial understanding existing between England, France, and Russia. She did not want war but she was willing to risk war in the hope that this end might be achieved. When it became perfectly evident that the combination was too strong for her to break up and that a general war would result, she then made sincere efforts to avert the catastrophe. By that time the situation was too critical and Russia mobilized. In view of Germany's previous failure to take adequate action for the preservation of peace and in view of her attempt to overawe Russia, France and England felt they could not condemn the act as without justification so that it might be fairly qualified as aggression.

As far as I am aware Lord Grey never maintained that "Belgian neutrality was the sole cause of England's entering the war against her will." I cannot understand how a responsible statesman can use words with such inaccuracy.

It is a tribute to the moral sense of mankind that after two and a half years of the most terrific war of history they should be debating the responsibility for the outbreak. That the German Chancellor should go laboriously over the same old ground and be unable to discover any new evidence to extenuate Germany's guilt for the outbreak of the war and the still more indefensible invasion of unoffending Belgium is perhaps of less importance than the fact that he should now be engaged in the effort. It is an indication that Germany recognizes her responsibility before the bar of the world's opinion.

ELLERY C. STOWELL.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Allies' Reply and the Probability of Peace

SIR: The answer of the Allies to the request of President Wilson for a statement of terms upon which they would make peace is a crushing blow to the hopes entertained in many quarters of a real international organization and a new order of society after the war is over. The great factors to be achieved were not so much physical or military, political or administrative, as psychological. If the analysis of the great majority of the people in the Allied countries was correct, the all-important desideratum was the changing somehow or other of the minds of the German people. Somehow or other they must be honestly brought to believe that they have been misinformed by their leaders and statesmen; made to see that their existence was not and is not threatened, that no nation does or has thirsted for their blood or treasure, that their need for defense is not of the sort that requires an army so great as practically to overshadow the state itself, that all reasonable rights and privileges on the seas will be indefinitely theirs, that all other nations see in their commercial prosperity and rapid economic development mutual advantages.

Naturally this analysis of the situation presumed that the psychological attitude of the people in the Allied countries toward the Germans were literally and precisely the ideas here defined, that they were honestly willing to abide by these ideas and to be satisfied with them, that they honestly could acquit themselves of the charges which the Germans made, and honestly knew their own capacity to remain guiltless of them. The war grew out of a misunderstanding or a misconception of the intention and attitudes of peoples toward each other. If the Germans misunderstood the people of the Allied countries or their statesmen, it was all-important that the misunderstanding should be removed by the conversion of the Germans. Obviously if the Germans did not misunderstand the people in the Allied countries this whole analysis of the situation was wrong and would fall to the ground, and the issue and justifiability of the purpose of the war will once more be open to discussion.

The all-important thing was that the German people should be genuinely converted by the war, that somehow or other it should so be conducted as to prove to them that they were wrong in all their premises, conduct and assumptions. They must be made to see that the invasion of Belgium, submarine attacks without warning, the use of poisoned gas, and the like, are unavailing and morally wrong. The vital thing needed was so to fight the war and so to conduct peace negotiations that the humanitarian conduct of the one and the moderation of the other should convince the German people that a code of humane conduct did exist which was observed by other nations and which they had broken, and that the stories of the hostility of the Entente toward the Central Powers were nightmares and misapprehensions. Even a defeated Germany should find the Allies generous and forgiving.

But all that is at an end. The terms announced by the Allies as those upon which they are willing to make peace again, for this great purpose of convincing the German people that the Kaiser was wrong and the Allies right, could not well be worse than they are. They insist upon the uttermost farthing, they demand the whole pound of flesh cut from the heart. They will be satisfied, according to their own solemn official protestation delivered in all solemnity to the head of a great neutral nation for his information, with nothing less than what Germans will

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deem the destruction of the political position and international importance of both Germany and Austria.

Will not such terms convince all Germans who have had doubts that the Kaiser was right and the peace party wrong? Will they not confirm and strengthen the belief of the great majority in the Central Powers that the Allies did and do wish the destruction of the political importance of those two nations? Nothing could have been done by the Allies so well calculated to prove to high and low, great and small, intelligent and ignorant throughout the Central Empires that the war was necessary, inevitable, justifiable; that it must be fought to a finish before they accept any terms; that the army is and must continue to be Germany's only possible defense against such overwhelming hatred and jealousy. There will be few who will not believe that they are fighting now to preserve their nation and race from literal extinction, and that the price of failure will be national death.

"What are your aims and purposes?" the Allies have been asked by a bystander, and they have themselves literally defined their objects and aims as those which the Pan-Germanists have for twenty years assured the world were indeed their purposes. They have proved the case; convicted themselves, to German thinking, out of their own mouths; confirmed and established with evidence as no German could, the argument in favor of the Kaiser, the army, and the fleet, in favor of militarism and Pan-Germanism.

Whatever the outcome of this war, this confession, as the Germans will no doubt term it, and the conviction of the justifiability and necessity of all that has been done, which it will with little question sow in German hearts, will remain as one of the permanent results of the war. It is hardly possible that anything can now remove that conviction from the minds of the German people. It is hardly possible that that kind of result can be looked for from the war which so many have seen probable: convincing the German people that the Kaiser was wrong and that militarism must be abandoned. Defeat, conquest, humiliation, will indeed only intensify this belief and demonstrate its verity. The outlook for permanent peace in Europe and in the world is indeed dark.

ROLAND G. USHER.

St. Louis, Missouri.

How to Make the Republican Party Progressive

SIR: In THE NEW REPUBLIC of December 16th, Mr. Lippmann makes a clever criticism of what the Progressive Republicans, who met at Chicago on December 4th, do not intend to do. We do not seek a minority voice in Republican councils, but, in the language of the statement issued, we seek "to progressivize the Republican party." We believe that over three-fourths of the progressive minded voters can be united within the Republican party and can control the party, and we do not believe that a majority of the Democratic rank and file is or can be made progressive.

Mr. Lippmann's apparent suggestion that the progressives should not be aligned with either party—should be "elusive, surprising, hard to catch and impossible to hold" means that there should be no progressive party—that those who believe in progressivism should let reactionaries control both parties and leave to progressives the amiable function of always voting for the least undesirable candidates. From 1912 to 1916 the Progressives were certainly "elusive, surprising, hard to catch and impossible to hold"; but their political potency decreased steadily by reason of these virtues, and in 1916 political effectiveness required the leaders to ally themselves with one of the older parties. Sincerely feeling that there was a national crisis, a majority of the Progressive leaders allied themselves with the Republicans. But the reactionary group had retained the power to prosecute a campaign of failure, from whose bitter lesson we believe some good may come. In our judgment the election proved—first, that the Republican party offers the best political machinery to progressivism, and second, that the rank and file of the Republican party will no longer follow the old guard, and that the Republican issue for the future is clear: Become a progressive party, or remain a minority party.

The game which the Progressive Republicans propose to play is not poker with the old guard as Mr. Lippmann suggests. They propose to call upon the Republican voters to break up the poker party of the old guard and put a representative board of directors at the council table. At the outset the suggestion is made that there are already many of the Republican managers who do not care to play poker with the political fortunes of the country. Perhaps there are enough to break up the old game, invite Progressive leaders in and reorganize with them. The suggestion of the Progressive Republicans is merely a way of seeking information as to who are friends and foes of progress in the Republican party. It is desirable in politics to express one's self with a simplicity suitable for the average comprehension. But it appears that though "Messrs. Rowell, Gifford Pinchot, Robins, Garfield, White and Ickes....are too simple to play politics," in Mr. Lippmann's judgment, they failed to express themselves with simplicity appropriate to convey their thought to him.

Let the idea be put thus: The Republican voters desire progressive leadership. By suggesting recognition of this fact to the present leadership we will at the outset separate the friends and foes of progressivism. Third, let us launch a program, which will farther test out the Republican leadership and serve as the basis for organizing the voters to progressivize the Republican party. Believing in democratic principles, let us only suggest these things tentatively, so that common sentiment may direct our future course. Above all things let us be sufficiently simple and direct in purpose and statements so that it will be clear to the American people that we are not seeking to play poker politics with the old guard, or with any group of antisepticized reactionaries. We formed a Progressive party in America and we intend that a progressive party shall govern America before we die.

HAROLD L. ICKES.

Chicago, Illinois.

[NOTE: I did not question the intentions of the Progressive Republican leaders, but their political shrewdness. My point was that by proclaiming themselves members of Its Majesty the Old Guard's loyal opposition, they are repeating the mistake which led to the humiliation of the Chicago conventions. They will not make the Republican party progressive by assuming a position now where they must oppose the Democrats in 1920 and cannot create a party of their own. So long as they commit themselves to the Republican party in *advance* they will have precious little influence upon it; they will be used again as window dressing.—W. L.]

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After the Play

THE essence of priggishness, Samuel Butler remarks, is setting up to be better than one's neighbor. For persons like ourselves, who are really better than our neighbors, this definition has no teen; but I know a man to whom I'd apply it. We met him as we came out of the theatre after seeing "Good Gracious Annabelle." He was obviously sustaining emotion. On his ordered young countenance he exhibited the traces of an anguish nobly borne. My companion, who knew him from childhood, addressed him thuswise: "Well, Blankie, didn't you have a good time?" Blankie answered: "Are we never to have a play in which there is not an intoxicated man? It is too disgusting. I have done nothing this winter but see drunken men on the stage." "The world," my companion smiled on him, "is all too clearly going to the dogs." To me she murmured, "The poor simpleton, he has absolutely nothing in his head, absolutely not a thing. And hear him talk, I beg of you, as if we'd been wallowing in the sink of iniquity." And on him, as he solemnly bowed his head to depart in a motor, very likely his mother's, she purposely refrained from smiling a gossip's perfidious good-night.

As to other inebriate performances this young man was possibly sound. I do not recall them. But his freezing disapproval of "Good Gracious Annabelle" showed too great a preoccupation with correctness. It was his business at "Good Gracious Annabelle" to be amused. He had no other business there, and if that play did not succeed in amusing him he could only say he failed it or it failed him. He could not successfully raise the question of taste. For the play was so arranged from the start, both by author and by cast, that a neighborliness was aroused in the audience, and the one kind of man who could hold out against that neighborliness was the kind that sets up to be better than his neighbor.

The fable of "Good Gracious Annabelle" hardly needs to be mentioned. Its object is merely to give a competent cast its chance to be amusing, and to give the author play for her fancy. Everything really turns on the charmingness of Annabelle. Without that, without the fillip to our friendliness that is provoked by a piquant girl, there would be no excuse for taking up with her little adventure. But once we willingly adopt the tone of the good-natured lawyer who is guardian of Annabelle's misfortune, once we second him in taking her under our wing, the humor of her position and its solution becomes a source of constant entertainment. Seeing the pennilessness of everyone with whom she is stranded in her stylish New York hotel, in the midst of giving a luncheon party, the tax on Annabelle's charm as well as her purse is evident. It is actually a farcical situation, but a single trace of farce in Annabelle would change everything. By the art of actress and author, however, this subsidized, extravagant, independent princess of the American realm manages in every impulse and gesture to capture that American blitheness out of which, one might loosely say, Henry James eked a greater part of his treasure. This comedy is of a cheaper metal, naturally, but of the same national currency that Mr. James delighted to specialize in, the currency with a winged victory for model. She is irresponsible, this Annabelle, but she does not lose her note of happy expectations and fresh confidence and sensible girlish candor. And when she decides to make her way via the kitchen, with all her friends as fellow-servants, she wins her audience to the extent of their issuing a blank check on credulity.

Fortunately for the dramatist, there is no limit to the luck through which Annabelle is hired as cook for a Long Island country-house. The swigging little spendthrift whose butler engages her is none other than the man who has come to possess her priceless share of stock. And the man who pays for her luncheon party and who bribes the spendthrift's butler to make him free of the Long Island estate is none other than the man who wants the priceless share of stock, and who, years before, etc.; which is the marvelous secret of the whole play. There is little in these contrivances to justify amusement in "Good Gracious Annabelle." They are unusually preposterous. But no comedy depends less on its fable, or more on the manner in which each clash of character is heightened and displayed. Displayed, that is, for the sake of a pleasant silliness, of a merriment showing that sympathy has been engaged.

To turn a story of life into an amusing game a dramatist must either have a remarkable plot or a singular prettiness of fancy or a happy gift for engaging the sympathy of the audience. It is this last gift that, for most of those who see it, makes the slightness of "Good Gracious Annabelle" as irrelevant as the vagrancy of a perfume. One cares nothing, as one sits at it, about the fatuity of the poet turned gardener or the squalor of the bibulous scullery-maid or the unrelieved drunkenness of the dissipated little heir. All these exhibitions of character and the lack of it come out only as part of a comedy pattern, in which the redemption of Annabelle's fortunes is the game at which one plays. She is a ninny about money, just as the hotel detective is an idiot about psychanalysis, but we never feel that the drunkenness has any significance except in relation to Annabelle's escapade, and it is no more a thing to be moralized about than the departure of Don Quixote from pacificism. Unless, of course, we are moralists like the Rockefellers, who unanimously frown upon indulgence in anything except industrial alcohol. The pattern of comedy in "Good Gracious Annabelle" is quite readily accepted as soon as Annabelle herself attains our sympathy; and to that she should be sufficiently helped by her completeness as a daughter of the feministic American gods.

If an Elizabethan came to New York and managed the dangerous journey from his hotel to Broadway and 42nd Street, I do not believe he would find as much amusement inside the theatres as he would on the earth outside, and above the earth, and underneath. If he sought "Turn to the Right," I think he'd be amused by its quips but amazed at its imaginative emptiness and its vapid sentimentality. If he looked to Willie Collier in "Nothing but the Truth," I think he'd be surprised at the exaggerations of the accomplished star's performance and dismayed by the want of dramatic resource and subtlety in developing so good an idea. If he saw "The Thirteenth Chair," I believe he'd be intrigued and excited, recognizing some old tricks and many new ones, and seeing distinguished perception in the work of Miss Margaret Wycherly. He might try many other plays, in the mood of a stranger seeking gaiety and elation and a flight into the sun of comedy. I believe he could seek farther than "Good Gracious Annabelle" and fare worse. Neither Miss Vokes as scullery-maid nor Mr. Nicander as the master nor Mr. Roland Young as the poet would offer him performances at any great remove from his own tradition. They'd be likely to amuse him. And if the Annabelle of Miss Lola Fisher failed to pique him, I miss my Elizabethan guess.

F. H.

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Books and Things

ALTHOUGH we may nowadays treat the Golden Treasury too much like a common anthology, as if it were only a convenient place for meeting old friends, yet at one time or another we have all admired, some of us without help and some not until Matthew Arnold had shown us how to admire, the beautiful putting together of its pieces, the way in which many of them gain, from their setting among the right neighbors, something of color or meaning or sound.

Those who perceive for themselves, or those who can perceive with assistance—which class do we belong to? "The Spirit of Man" will not help us to an answer, for in this new anthology, made by the poet laureate, Robert Bridges, and published a year ago (Longmans, Green & Company, $1.50), the arrangement is so winning that he must be a dull reader who can withstand its action. Perfection of arrangement was no doubt easier for Mr. Bridges to approach than for Palgrave. "The Spirit of Man" is not a collection "of the best songs and lyrical poems in the English language." Its aim is to illustrate and support the belief "that spirituality is the basis and foundation of human life." Prose and verse in English and French are admitted, and so are translations from the Russian, from Greek and Latin, and things brought from the East. A purpose so much more special than Palgrave's gave Mr. Bridges material more homogeneous, less refractory, not so hard to put in order.

The success of his chosen order is obvious if we will read his book as he would have us read it, beginning at the beginning and going straight ahead. He leads us in all ease from mood to mood, takes us with him all the way, leaves us rested and bettered by the journey. His taste and art allow us to feel, for a short time and in the case of some of us perhaps for the last time, the beauty of those spiritual moods to which nowadays we do not rise by accident, nor yet by will, nor at all without the help of strong hands. I know that while I was reading his book the other day I had an illusion that I was growing physically lighter, that not only did my eyes look up through the clouds to serener spaces, but that I was carried gently upward to them, and breathed for a while those brighter, purer and austerer airs where Mr. Bridges lives and is at home, nor ever suffers from mountain sickness. Great must be the persuasiveness of an anthology which can lift a heavy body to uncongenial spiritual heights.

Coming down to earth again, later, I asked how it was that I, whose soul is no frequenter of the uplands, visiting them but seldom and never staying long, had been so submissive to Mr. Bridges. Why had I not been on guard against being exalted? Why had I not resisted this unfamiliar refining process? And the answer, when it came, came as a surprise. Mr. Bridges has printed the names of his authors at the end of his book. "It is true," he writes, "that very often we cannot fully understand a passage unless we know who wrote it; on the other hand it is an idle and pernicious habit to ask for information on any question before bringing one's own judgment to bear upon it; and this book may even have a secondary usefulness in providing material for the exercise of literary judgment, in those who have any taste for the practice." This exercise in literary judgment, made possible because Mr. Bridges has printed nearly all his pieces without names, kept me from suspecting that I was growing too spiritual to be true. Vanity's strongest instinct is the instinct of self-preservation, but vanity also likes to run risks. Sometimes I tried to guess who wrote what I was reading, sometimes I tried only to guess the writer's epoch. My mistakes were many, as when I failed to give Thomas à Kempis his own, and could not put Marcus Aurelius near his right century. Most of all was I vexed when I ascribed to Pascal, of whom I judge as the good judges do, a piece written by Amiel, whom I like but feebly, believing the good judges rate him too high. And in general I found, whenever I was certain of an author's name, that it was memory which made me certain, and not insight.

Perhaps the spirituality in this book would seem too spiritual if one's attention were not taken off it by the exercise in literary judgment. At times the wish to attribute rightly is on top, and at times this disappears and one attends only to the wisdom or beauty or high mind of the written things. Thus a reader's attention, turning from this hand to that hand, keeps its strength without faltering, has even strength to spare for a hundred and one details, for the skill with which the high color of Bacon or of Burke is placed so as not to seem out of harmony with its quieter surroundings, for the contrast, in Mr. Bridges's own subtly-rhythmed quantitative hexameters, between the pattern made by the quantities and the pattern made by the stressed syllables. Now the patterns coincide, now they have separated and each is trying to get possession of the listener's ear. Now we move with the stressed syllables against the stream of the quantities, now the stressed syllables and the long syllables are the same for a few feet, and what we hear is less complex and moves faster. Newer and more varied rhythms are given to the ear in the experiments Mr. Bridges has made in quantitative verse than in all the free verse I have read.

Besides his hexameters from Virgil and Homer Mr. Bridges has put into this book "a few half-original verse-translations," and a few of his improvements upon other translators' work. A study of these reworkings of older versions will delight anybody who likes to perceive, in these small and transforming touches, how small a change may make how great a difference. But on the whole Mr. Bridges has feared too much "a perpetual temptation to quote from himself." I wish he had felt this temptation oftener. Here we have only one poem by Robert Bridges. I wish he had put in the last one in Book V of his "Shorter Poems," for I know of no poem, anywhere, that better expresses the final mood in which his anthology would leave us:

Weep not to-day: why should this sadness be?
Learn in present fears
To o'ermaster those tears
That unhindered conquer thee.

Think on thy past valour, thy future praise:
Up, sad heart, nor faint
In ungracious complaint,
Or a prayer for better days.

Daily thy life shortens, the grave's dark peace
Draweth surely nigh,
When good-night is good-bye;
For the sleeping shall not cease.

Fight, to be found fighting: nor far away
Deem, nor strange thy doom.
Like this sorrow 'twill come,
And the day will be to-day.

P. L.

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A New Novelist

Windy McPherson's Son, by Sherwood Anderson. New York: John Lane Co. $1.40.

"WINDY McPHERSON" has a Scottish sound. It suggests a revival of those quaint Hoot Man novels that once enabled Ian MacLaren and J. M. Barrie and the author of "The Lilac Sunbonnet" to make hay. To pump up enthusiasm for such a novel at this date would be perverse rather than heroic, and the honest reader might well shrink from being asked to admire another variation in plaid styles. But there is no need for aversion in this instance. It is only Mr. Sherwood Anderson's title that implies gnarled dialect and thorn-tree humor. "Windy McPherson's Son" has nothing whatever to do with the bonnie blue bell or the bonnie brier bush, it was not written out of love for the bonnie bonnie banks of Loch Lomond, or the still more bonnie bonnie Bank of Scotland.

A Chicago man born in a small middle-western town, Mr. Anderson has written a novel of the life he himself knows. He begins with Caxton, Iowa. Sam McPherson, the son of that "Windy" who indulged in G. A. R. ballyhoo, is the newsboy of his little town on the railway line between Omaha and Chicago. Sam is reticent and keen and efficient in inverse ratio to the drunkenness and wind and waste of his father. After his mother's death the boy makes Chicago. In the commission business on South Water Street he founds his fortune. He steps up into the management of an arms corporation, gets to the top, marries the daughter of the president, and faces life on a spiritual plane where keenness and efficiency alone are not enough. After a few years of life on the terms that his wife predicates, McPherson sees a chance to have himself count in a consolidation that will require him to eliminate his wife's bombastic father if he is to go through. He does go through and his wife leaves him. The rest of the story is fabulous success followed by degeneration, then by a revolutionary attempt to reach happiness and significance, and finally by an acceptance of a common lot.

One hardly needs to be told that this is the work of a new novelist. Although it embodies a wisdom of experience not often traceable in a beginner's fiction, it has a freshness that belongs to the springtime of creation. It is not merely a novel of personal fortunes. It is a novel of the meaning of life. Where a more practised novelist might have been content to tell a story, Mr. Anderson has sought to give expression to those long thoughts which so enamor the young novelist, which so often break in the weaving like a gossamer too thin to be spun. In his failure as well as in his success Mr. Anderson has gone far beyond most of his contemporaries. Where he has failed, that is to say, he has proved a larger genuineness than most of his contemporaries prove by their success. This failure is not, of course, a warranty that Mr. Anderson is now a Great Novelist, and so on. But it is part of that bravery of the spirit without which no novel can be incorporated by its reader.

If "Windy McPherson's Son" is not successfully genuine all through, it is perhaps because of Mr. Anderson's zealousness to project all of a destiny. Knowing quite thoroughly the man who is out to win, self-made, combative, daring, shrewd, self-reliant, strong, Mr. Anderson appears to have wanted to give him his climax at any cost, for the sake of the downfall afterward. With that in mind, Mr. Anderson was satisfied to represent rather thinly and poorly the relations between Sue Rainey and Sam McPherson. Sue Rainey is excellently described in the exacerbation of her first tragic pregnancy, and its effect on her husband's ideal of her is well imagined. But what one most wants, Sue's version of herself in her relation to this mailed warrior, is not completely realized. Of course, we have at the start the formula of their relations. She says: "I am wealthy. You are able and you have a kind of undying energy in you. I want to give both my wealth and your ability to children—our children. That will not be easy for you. It means giving up your dreams of power. Perhaps I shall lose courage. Women do after two or three have come. You will have to furnish that. You will have to make a mother of me and keep making a mother of me. You will have to be a new kind of father with something maternal in you. You will have to be patient and studious and kind. You will have to think of these things at night instead of thinking of your own advancement. You will have to live wholly for me because I am to be their mother, giving me your strength and courage and your good sane outlook on things. And then when they come you will have to give all these things to them day after day in a thousand little ways." Waiving the question of Sam's ability to give his ability to his children, there is much difficulty about believing that any Sue could say this to any Sam. Granted that it is an accurate formula, that it expresses what every woman is supposed to feel, it reads much more like an author's reasoned memorandum than like a girl's actual announcement.

This speech is a fair example of a common kind of novelistic speech that does not seem to have the texture of life. Even if the critic is wrong in thinking that a woman seldom has so conscious a program for the selection and direc-

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tion of her confederate in the solemn responsibilities of procreation, there is still the question whether she would disclose her purpose, or purposes, to the person she is about to nominate. In these matters human beings vary monstrously, but they are more than likely to proceed by indirection, especially in bourgeois Chicago in the early stages of a love affair between a boy from Iowa and a girl in the fashionable society of 1890 or thereabouts. And if the reader has at all the conviction that indirectness is the human process in these matters of sensibility and amenity, he gets less than nothing of personal character and temperament and intonation from a novelist who hurries his plot by putting in such a quickener. There is no special point in the directness of such speeches. Mr. Anderson proffers them as if they had the pure accent of ordinary mankind. But if a woman could say a thing like this to her lover, from herself and not out of a book, she would be entitled to a novel all by her lonesome—or entitled to another "Man and Superman." The attentive ear does not often record these utterances; and between them and the utterances to which a novelist like Arnold Bennett gives sanction there is a difference not merely of attention. There is that infinitesimal yet marvelous difference that lifts the inorganic to the organic. To be said to live, a fictional personality must not only come from a generative artist, it must be integrated out of the materials of a world actually possessed. And where there is any failure of knowing and caring, as here suggested, there is only a bluff at creation. It is a bluff, curiously enough, which Americans rather despise Englishmen and Frenchmen and Russians for taking such enormous pains to avoid, pains that are against all the philosophy of being in business for profit. Living in a day of business enterprise when real rewards may be gained by goods that are just made to market, Americans see no great reason for severe integrity in the art of fiction. And yet without such integrity, the kind that makes the Five Towns true to the experience of two continents, there is no more vitality in a novel than there was in those deceptive blue birds described by Maeterlinck.

The point about "Windy McPherson's Son," however, is its liberal suggestion of a new integrity in the American novel. Eloquent as the characters are in Caxton—the verbal dandy, the mad Irishman, the schoolteacher nipped by scandal, the revivalist, the woman burdened by a veteran yearning over a thousand battles never fought—they are only part of the suggestive wealth of the story. Symbolic as Sam's wanderings are, and meagre and personal as his Research is, there is a continual flood of humanity, American humanity, through sincere and exciting pages. And for all the traces of the beginner's art, there is the virtue of unexpectedness in the story, the supreme quality of the organism which a story should have.

The final impression of "Windy McPherson's Son" is one of poetic power. Although Mr. Anderson has a clean veracity about sex his version of the relations between men and women is rather cramped. He records the estrangement between the sexes with some bitterness. But his novel as a whole has less bitterness than one might expect from a man who has become a novelist in the artistic orphanage of the industrial Middle West. To have refused all fostering from the English and French masters, to have seen Iowa and Chicago for himself, exhibits in high degree that courage in isolation which is the heavy price of breaking new ground. That price Mr. Anderson has paid. In his succinct and quick-moving novel he has made the America of the small town his own, its stridencies and heart-hungers and their spiral

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

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

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